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CHAPTER NINE
RECENT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
The Barnette and Schempp decisions of 1943 and 1963 respectively
brought free exercise and establishment clause values to their fullest
expression.

But the twenty year period between the two cases was one of

profound social change.

The Cold War, the arms race, internal

subversion, the civil rights movement, foreign trade, and foreign aid
were among the dominant political issues in the two decades that
followed the Second World War.

America had by then become the premier

world political, economic, and military power.

Amidst a booming

economy, a generation of victorious soldiers became the core of a new
middle class.
But peace and prosperity ever prove to be fugitive visions.

In a

period of less than nine months in 1963 and 1964, the assassination of
the President and the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution seem in retrospect to
have triggered a series of shocks that sent the country careering
through a decade of internal strife and external defeat unlike any
period since the Civil War and reconstruction.

This decade full of

passionate intensity finally spent itself in the Watergate escapade and
the collapse of the war effort in Indochina.

It has been followed by a

decade of irresolution which calls to mind William Butler Yeat's comment
that "the best lack all conviction."

In some respects, the Court itself

has reflected the changing times in a changing of the guard.
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Doctrinal Entanglements
The doctrinal tensions noted by Chief Justice Burger, Justice
Rehnquist, and others has occasionally surfaced in cases that cover
issues ranging from unemployment compensation and employment practices
to religious displays on public property and tax exemptions for
churches.

The conflicts have been most clearly evident in regard to

church property disputes and aid to private schools.

But the greatest

innovations have come in cases involving conscientious objection.
Church Property
In the decades before and after its Watson decision, the Court
ruled upon a variety of church property disputes.

Some involved

bequests, as in Stanley v. Colt, 5 Wall. 119 (1866), Christian Union v.
Yount, 101 U.S. 352 (1880), and Gilmer v. Stone, 120 U.S. 586 (1887).
Others involved disputes concerning communal property, such as the
German Separatist colony at Zoar, Ohio in Goesele v. Bimeler, 14 How.
589 (1852), and the Harmony Society of Beaver County, Pennsylvania--a
sect known as the Rappites--in Baker v. Nachtrieb, 19 How. 126 (1856),
and Speidel v. Henrici, 120 U.S. 377 (1887).

In Smith v. Swormstedt, 16

How. 288 (1853), the Court was asked to assist in the division of common
property when the Methodist Episcopal Church split over the issue of
slavery.

But not all the property cases during this period dealt with

internal church disputes.

In Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.

404 (1886), the Court ruled that church land which is left unnecessarily
vacant is not exempt from local taxes.
The Court did not base any of its church property rulings on the
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First Amendment until 1952 when it reversed the judgment of the New York
courts in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952), a case
involving the right to use and occupy a church that was complicated by
international politics and Cold War attitudes.

Justice Reed reviewed

the history of the Russian Orthodox Church in America, the
ecclesiastical disruptions that accompanied the Bolshevik Revolution,
and the circumstances that led to the temporary administrative
separation of the American diocese in 1924 until such time as a general
convention or sobor should be legally convened in Moscow.

When an

admittedly canonical sobor was held in 1945, the delegates from North
America were prevented from attending because of delays.
the American congregations met at a sobor held

~n

A year later,

Cleveland, discussed

the question of reunion, and decided to refuse the Moscow Patriarchy's
stipulation that the American church abstain from political activities
against the Soviet Union.
As Justice Frankfurter emphasized in his concurring opinion: "What
is at stake here is the power to exercise religious authority" (344 U.S.
94, 121).
authority."

"A cathedral is the seat and center of ecclesiastical
Because of the turmoil that accompanied Soviet interference

with the church, the Legislature of New York passed a special act in
1925 that incorporated the cathedral, which was occupied by the head of
the American churches.

In 1945 and 1948, the legislature added

provisions to the Religious Corporations Law that recognized the Russian
Church in America as "an administratively autonomous metropolitan
district."

The archbishop appointed by the Moscow hierarchy challenged

the validity of this action and called it an interference with the free
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exercise of religion.

The Court agreed with this argument and

additionally held that New York's legislative application of the cy-pres
doctrine was invalid, since the case did not involve either the
dissolution of a charitable corporation for unlawful practives or the
failure of a charitable purpose.
Justice Jackson, however, contended that the controversy was a
matter for settlement by state law and concluded that the religious
freedom issue was insubstantial.

Even if the legislature had resorted

to a transfer--rather than a confirmation--of property rights that
resulted in a denial of due process, such an action would only "raise a
question of deprivation of property, not of liberty:"
The fact that property is dedicated to a religious use cannot, in
my oplnlon, justify the Court in sublimating an issue over property
rights into one of deprivation of religious liberty which alone
would bring in the religious guaranties of the First Amendment. I
assume no one would pretend that the State cannot decide a claim of
trespass, larceny, conversion, bailment or contract, where the
property involved is that of a religious corporation or is put to
religious use, without invading the principle of religious liberty
(344 u.s. 94, 130).
He characterized the Russian ecclesiastical establishment as a captive
church and, after describing the case as one involving "an ostensible
schism with decided political overtones," denied that "New York law must
yield to the authority of a foreign and unfriendly state masquerading as
a spiritual institution" (344 U.S. 94, 127, 131 ).
This did not settle the matter, however, and the dispute came once
again before the Court on a common law question in Kreshik v. St.
Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).

Again, the Court reversed.

Cold War politics also played a major role in First Unitarian
Church v. County of Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958), a case in which
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issues about church property, test oaths, and conscientious objection
converged.

Under a provision of the California constitution, the tax

exemption of church property was conditioned on the taking of a loyalty
oath.

As a matter of conscience, the members, officers, and ministers

of First Unitarian Church refused to comply and denied "'power in the
state to compel acceptance by it or any other church of this or any
other oath of coerced affirmation as to church doctrine, advocacy or
beliefs'" (357 U.S. 545, 547).

But Justice Clark, who dissented in this

and a companion case, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), approved
the view of the California court which had upheld the requirement: "'An
exemption from taxation is the exception and the unusual . . . . It is a
bounty or gratuity on the part of the sovereign and when once granted
may be withdrawn"' (357 U.S. 513, 541).

He added: "Refusal of the

taxing sovereign's grace in order to avoid subsidizing or encouraging
activity contrary to the sovereign's policy is an acccepted practice"
(357 U.S. 513, 543).

This choice of words is unfortunate but revealing,

since it is in the familiar language of divine right which the crowned
heads of Europe arrogated to themselves.

The law is a veritable

reliquary of such unamended, and perhaps unexamined, holdovers of the
tradition of established religion.
The next church property case, Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969), added a new wrinkle to the Watson doctrine
when the Court ruled that "there are neutral principles of law,
developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without
'establishing' churches to which property is awarded" (393 U.S. 440,
449).

The issue in this case was whether alleged departures from
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doctrine by the hierarchy of the Presbyterian Church in the United
States had violated its constitution and terminated an implied trust,
thus freeing local churches to secede and retain their property.

The

concept of an implied trust was used in the nineteenth century to help
resolve internal church disputes but often required courts of equity to
scrutinize doctrinal standards in determining whether the trustees had
departed from them.

The doctrinal departures in question in the Hull

Church case included the ordination of women, making political
pronouncements, supporting the removal of Bible reading and prayers from
public schools, "teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession of Faith
and Catechisms," and requiring all member churches to remain in the
National Council of Churches.
Justice Brennan declared that it was appropriate for courts to make
marginal reviews of ecclesiastical determinations and reaffirmed the
definition of this role that Justice Brandeis gave in the Gonzalez case:
"'In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of
the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although
affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular
courts as conclusive. .

"' (280 U.S. 1, 16; 393 U.S. 440, 447).

But he

concluded that "the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia
implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at
the very core of religion--the interpretation of particular church
doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion" (393
U.S. 440, 450), a role that is forbidden by the First Amendment.

The

Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court, which ultimately
resolved the issue in favor of the local church on a different basis.
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A few months later, Justice Brennan developed his views further
when he concurred with the Court's per curiam dismissal--for want of a
substantial federal question--of an appeal in Maryland and Virginia
Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970).
Turning to the Watson, Kedroff, and Hull Church decisions as models, he
outlined three approaches that he believed were permissible for states
to adopt in settling property disputes.

Regarding the

"neutral-principles" approach suggested in the last case, he wrote:
"Under the 'formal title' doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership
by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws"
(396

u.s.

367, 371).

In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976), the Court split over a complicated case involving the defrocking
of a priest and the resolution of a property dispute.

The majority

found the neutral-principles approach inapplicable in this case and held
that the courts must defer to the decision of the church's ruling
hierarchy.

But Justices Rehnquist and John Paul Stevens believed that

the Illinois courts had correctly applied neutral principles of law.

In

addition, they disagreed with the Court's acceptance of the petitioners'
deference argument:
Such blind deference
is counseled neither by logic nor by the
First Amendment. To make available the coercive powers of civil
courts to rubber-stamp ecclesiastical decisions of hierarchical
religious associations, when such deference is not accorded similar
acts of secular voluntary associations, would, in avoiding the free
exercise problems petitioners envision, itself create far more
serious problems under the Establishment Clause" (426 U.S. 696,
735).
The Brennan and Rehnquist viewpoints converged in Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595 (1979), when the Court upheld Georgia's use of the
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neutral-principles approach and held that the First Amendment does not
require the states to "adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious
authority in resolving church disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal
controversy is involved" (443 U.S. 595, 605).

Justice Blackmun agreed

that this approach was not free of difficulties but maintained that
hierarchical churches could take steps to "ensure, if they so desire,
that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church
property" (443 U.S. 595, 606).

But three justices joined Justice Lewis

Powell's dissent in the belief that the approach invited intrusion into
the church polity.
One result of the Jones decision is the rejection of the implied
trust concept.

According to Dallin Oaks, the justices associated with

Justice Brennan's viewpoint are even unwilling to examine express trusts
if they require a determination of religious law or doctrine.

Oaks

believes that a century of precedents will need to be reexamined and
views the state of church property law as a specimen of the larger
conflict over the relationship between church and state today:
The last two decades of the twentieth century are likely to
involve more frequent legal conflicts between church and state.
These conflicts are a result of the general growth in government
regulation of private activities, the expanding role of government
as a provider of social welfare services traditionally provided by
churches, the insatiable revenue requirements of govern~ent and
churches, and the increasing secularization of society.
Another critic, Robert Recio, agreed with Justice Powell that an
examination of a church's structure is constitutionally permissible if
it is limited to determining where authority lies.

"Certainly,

determining the form of church governance as a fact is less dangerous to
free exercise than presuming church governance to be vested in the
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congregational majority without regard to the provisions by which the
parties had agreed to be governed prior to the conflict. n

2

Whether this

decision does indeed provide an opportunity for intrusion still remains
to be seen.

But this area of the law has become very fluid and the

status of the Watson rule is somewhat in doubt.
Religious Tests
Doubts have similarly intruded into other areas of legal doctrine.
One area of doubt is what is included in the word "religion" with
respect to the free exercise and establishment clauses.

Changes are

most evident in cases involving conscientious opposition to oaths and
obligations that violate personal beliefs.

The religion clauses have

had to do double duty, first as a means of protecting religious liberty
and second as a defense for any conscientious scruple deemed sincere,
including avowedly nonreligious or antireligious beliefs.
The initial departure from a theistic understanding of religion
came in United States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703 (2nd Cir. 1943), a case
involving conscientious objection.

Although Judge Augustus Hand

affirmed the lower court ruling against the defendant, he broadly
interpreted the religious grounds for draft exemption: "Religious belief
arises from the sense of inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the
individual to his fellow men and to his universe--a sense common to men
in the most primitive and the most civilized societies" (133 F.2d 703,
708).

Furthermore, Judge Hand held that a conscientious opposition to

war under any circumstances "may justly be regarded as a response of the
individual to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for
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many persons at the present time the equivalent of what has always been
thought a religious impulse" (133 F.2d 703, 708).

Although this shift

of attention from theology to anthropology--from the commands of God to
the beliefs of man--was not immediately endorsed by other courts, the
new approach gradually gained ground. 3

Justice Frankfurter recalled the

Kauten opinion in his Barnette and Saia dissents.
Subsequent cases have played down the traditional conception of
religion, even to the point of defining away problems with respect to
official use of religious language.

Thus in the Gallagher case the

Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling that a Sunday closing law
was unconstitutional and held that "the objectionable language"
--referring to the law's retention of the term "Lord's day"--was "merely
a

rel~c"

(366 U.S. 617, 627).

But it was in Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), that the
Supreme Court departed for the first time from a theistic definition of
religion.

In a unanimous ruling, the Court held that the prohibition of

religious tests for office in Article VI applies equally to the states,
which made this the last of the religion clauses to be specifically
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice Black, who

delivered the opinion of the Court, reviewed the history of test oaths
and cited the Court's opinion in the Girouard case to the effect that
the "test oath is abhorrent to our tradition."

Ouoting Justice

Jackson's opinion in the Barnette case, Justice Black underscored his
own view that church and state must be kept entirely separate and gave
the definition of religion a new twist:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal
Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess a belief
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or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass
laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against
non-believers, and neither can aid those religions based on a
belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs (367 U.S. 488, 495).
In a footnote to the last clause, Justice Black noted several
nontheistic religions: Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, and Secular
Humanism.

In effect, the earlier distinction between religion and "mere

belief and opinion" had become nearly erased.
Justice Brennan applied the Torcaso rule two years later in
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), when he stated that government
may not "compel affirmation of a repugnant belief."

This case, which

was decided on free exercise grounds, involved the ineligibility of a
Seventh-Day Adventist for unemployment compensation benefits because of
her refusal to work on Saturday.

Under a South Carolina law, a claimant

was ineligible for benefits if he "'failed, without good cause . . . to
accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office
or the employer . . . '" (374 U.S. 398, 401).
Justice Brennan believed that, as applied, this rule imposed a
direct burden on the free exercise of the appellant's religion and could
·not be justified on the basis of a compelling state interest.

"The

ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand"
(374 U.S. 398, 404).

Neither rights or public benefits may be so

conditioned: "It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of
religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of
conditions

~pon

a benefit or privilege" (374 U.S. 398, 404).

But he

393
denied that the Court was fostering an establishment of religion and
maintained that the ruling "reflects nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences . . . " (374

u.s. 398' 409) .
Justices Potter Stewart and John Harlan, however, took their cue
from the recent Sunday law cases and sought to clarify the case's
establishment clause implications.

In his concurring opinion, Justice

Stewart treated this case as a situation where legitimate free exercise
claims ran "into head-on collision with the Court's insensitive and
sterile construction of the Establishment Clause" (374 U.S. 398, 414).
He wanted to see the Court reverse its Sunday law decisions.

Justice

Harlan, who was joined by Justice White in dissenting, argued that an
exception on religious grounds would be a permissible accommodation of
religion.

But he disagreed with the Court's "conclusion that the State

is constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception to its general
rule of eligibility in the present case" (374 U.S. 398, 423).
In a case that similarly involved conscientious scruples, In re
Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), the Court vacated the contempt conviction
of a Minnesota woman who refused to serve as a juror because of her
religious conviction against judging others.
A religious test of sorts was again the issue in McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978).

This time the Court reversed a provision of the

Tennessee constitution that disqualified ministers from serving in the
state legislature, an English rule that had at one time or another been
observed by thirteen states.

The appellant was an ordained Baptist

minister who had been elected as a delegate to the state constitutional
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convention.
There was considerable disagreement, however, as to the
constitutional grounds for reversing the disqualification and the
opinions revealed the divisions that had begun to characterize the
Court's interpretation of the religion clauses.

Chief Justice Warren

Burger, who was joined by three others, took note that the
disqualification was originally intended to prevent the establishment of
a state religion.

He held that the Torcaso rule, which focused on

belief, did not apply because the disqualification was directed at the
status and conduct of the clergy but agreed that it unconstitutionally
conditioned the minister's free exercise right on the surrender of his
right to seek office.

Justice William Brennan, who was joined by

Justice Thurgood Marshall, noted that the minister had been disqualified
because of his leadership role in religion and his dedication "'to the
full time prpmotion of the religious objectives of a particular
religious sect.'"

He viewed the disqualification as a violation of the

minister's freedom of belief, then added that it violated the
establishment clause, as well.

Justice Stewart believed that the

Torcaso decision controlled because this case was virtually
indistinguishable.

Justice Byron White, however, contended that the

disqualification did not violate the appellant's free exercise right but
that it did deny him equal protection, noting that the disqualification
did not extend to judicial or executive offices.
At various times, Justices Stewart, Harlan, and Rehnquist
attributed the Court's difficulties to an inability to reconcile its
treatment of the establishment clause under the incorporation theory
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with its generous interpretation of the scope of free exercise
protections.

The clashing values are particularly evident in the

conscription cases, which gave practical effect to the new meaning of
religion.
Conscription
The peacetime draft and the outbreak of the Korean War set the
stage for the Court's intervention on behalf of the conscientious
objector claims of two members of Jehovah's Witnesses in Sicurella v.
United States, 348 U.S. 385 (1955), and Gonzalez v. United States, 348
U.S. 407 (1955).

In the first case, the Justice Clark contended that

the petitioner's willingness to fight in a spiritual war between the
powers of good and evil did not contradict his opposition to
participating in a shooting war.

In the second case, the Court ruled

that a registrant who was granted a hearing by the Department of Justice
had a right to have its recommendation furnished him at the time it was
sent to the selective service appeal board.

Justice Sherman Minton

objected that the Court ignored the congressional test for objectors,
which held that the opposition must be to participation in war in any
form.
After the Torcaso decision, the first test of its expanded
interpretation of religion came in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965), a case involving conscientious objection on ethical rather than
avowedly religious grounds.

Taking his lead from the use of "Supreme

Being" rather than "God" in the law, Justice Clark gave a broad
construction to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948
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and maintained that it provided considerable latitude for exempting
conscientious objectors:
We believe that under this construction, the test of belief "in a
relation to a Supreme Being" is whether a given belief that is
sincere and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its
possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God of
one who clearly qualifies for the exemption (380 U.S. 163,
165-66).
After discussing the implications of various lower court opinions on the
scope of the religious exemption, he declared that "we believe this
construction embraces the ever-broadening understanding of the modern
religious community" and cited the examples of Paul Tillich, John
Robinson, and David Muzzey, a leader in the Ethical Culture movement who
advocated an anthropocentric rather than a theocentric view of religion.
Later, he quoted Paul Tillich's definition of God as a person's
"ultimate concern:" "what you take seriously without any reservation"
(380 U.S. 163, 187).

Sincerity was thus made the test of belief.

The

shift of focus from theology to anthropology in the Torcaso decision
shifted once again, this time to psychology.
The Seeger decision turned the draft law's requirement of belief in
a "Supreme Being" into an anachronism and in due course it was dropped.
But first the Military Service Act of 1967 eased the strictures used to
determine eligibility for conscientious objector status in order to
bring the law into compliance with the Seeger doctrine.
changes failed to satisfy the Court.

Yet even these

In Welsh v. United States, 398

U.S. 333 (1970), Justice Black equated religion with any sincerely held
beliefs, including those which are purely ethical or moral in their
origin and content, such as a personal moral code.

The Court's

construction of the statute, however, flatly contradicted its express
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language.

Justice John Harlan concurred in the result because he

believed that the theistic standard was unconstitutional, but protested
what he called this "emasculated construction of a statute to avoid
facing a latent constitutional question . . • . "

After acknowledging

that he had been mistaken in supporting the Seeger ruling, he reviewed
the steps that had led to an obliteration of the theistic standard and
then commented:

"It is a remarkable feat of judicial surgery to remove,

as did Seeger, the theistic requirement.

The prevailing opinion today,

however, in the name of interpreting the will of Congress, has performed
a lobotomy . . • " (398 U.S. 333, 351).
Justice Byron White, who spoke for the three dissenters, agreed
with Justice Harlan's objection to the Court's construction of the
statue, but disagreed that religious classifications are
unconstitutional:
We have said that neither support nor hostility, but neutrality, is
the goal of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.
"Neutrality," however, is not self-defining. If it is "favoritism"
and not "neutrality" to exempt religious believers from the draft,
is it "neutrality' and not "inhibition" of religion to compel
religious believers to fight when they have special reasons for not
doing so, reasons to which the Constitution gives particular
recognition? It cannot be ignored that the First Amendment itself
contains a religious classification. The Amendment protects belief
and speech, but as a general proposition, the free speech
provisions stop short of immunizing conduct from official
regulation. The Free Exercise Clause, however, has a deeper cut:
it protects conduct as well as religious belief and speech . . . .
We should thus not labor to find a violation of the Establishment
Clause when free exercise values prompt Congress to relieve
religious believers from the burdens of the law at least in those
instances where the law is not merely prohibitory but commands the
performance of military duties that are forbidden by a man's
religion (398 U.S. 333, 372, 373).
In view of the Court's determination that any religious
classification must include all forms of belief, it was probably no
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surprise that the Court next decided to limit the grounds on which a
religious objection could be made.

In two companion cases, Gillette v.

United States and Negre v. Larsen, 401 U.S. 437 (1971 ), the Court upheld
the Selective Service's denial of an exemption to two objectors, one a
Humanist and the other a Roman Catholic, who were selectively opposed to
unjust or immoral wars.

Justice Thurgood Marshall asserted that the

petitioners in this case asked for "greater 'entanglement' by judicial
expansion of the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars'' and
concluded that "the Establishment Clause prohibits government from
abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one
religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect
or religious organization" (401 U.S. 437, 451 ).

He believed that

fairness was at stake:
Ours is a Nation of enormous heterogeneity in respect of political
views, moral codes, and religious persuasions. It does not bespeak
an establishing of religion for Congress to forgo the enterprise of
distinguishing those whose dissent has some conscientious basis
from those who simply dissent. There is a danger that as between
two would-be objectors, both having the same complaint against a
war, that objector would succeed who is more articulate, better
educated, or better counseled. There is even the danger of
unintended religious discrimination--a danger that a claim's
chances of success would be greater the more familiar or salient
the claim's connection with conventional religiosity could be made
to appear . . . . While the danger of erratic decisionmaking
unfortunately exists in any system of conscription that takes
individual differences into account, no doubt the dangers would be
enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were
honored in theory (401 U.S. 437, 458).
Justice Douglas wrote separate dissents in the two cases.

In the

first, he pointed out that the Court has never squarely faced up to the
question whether a conscientious objector can be required to kill and
ended by remarking: "I had assumed that the welfare of the single human
soul was the ultimate test of the vitality of the First Amendment" (401
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U.S. 437, 470).

In the second, he noted that under Roman Catholic

doctrine a person has a moral duty to take part in just wars, and to
refuse to participate in unjust wars, declared by his government.
Justice Douglas believed that the decision whether a war is just or
unjust "is a personal decision that an individual must make on the basis
of his own conscience after studying the facts" (401 U.S. 437, 472).
Almost as a footnote to the Gillette ruling, the Court held three
years later in Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974), that a denial of
veterans' educational benefits to conscientious objectors who had
performed alternative service did not create an arbitrary classification
or a violation of due process.

Justice Douglas was again the sole

dissenter in this case.
The Court's extension of religious grounds for conscientious
objection to include objection based on political, sociological, and
philosophical grounds in the Welsh case began raising questions about
the fairness of religious classifications.

Indeed, it is not altogether

clear why conscientious objection was ever restricted to a purely
theistic basis except possibly to silence a potentially major source of
opposition.

But the redefinition of religion by dilution is likely to

have many unforeseen consequences for the religious liberty guarantees
of the First Amendment.

Shortly after the Seeger decision, Donald

Giannella wrote that the Court's broadened definition of religion will
finally compel it to set some clear standards to decide what religious
practices fall within the protection of the First Amendment:
This much seems certain: regardless of whether the Court elects to
proceed under the free exercise clause or the due process and equal
protection clauses, it must formulate some kind of rudimentary
natural theology in order to evaluate nontheistic religious claims.

400

One may quarrel with the two main propositions I suggest--first,
that nontheistic practices seeking to advance individual
psychological and spiritual development are to be denied equal
status with sacramental acts of worship; and second, that only
those nontheistic conscientious objections that are based on
intensely felt, selfless, and thoroughgoing personal commitment to
the brotherhood of man should receive treatment equal to
theistically based scruples. But if the Court does not adopt broad
guidelines similar to these, it will have to evolve some oth~r
neotheological criteria to separate the dross from the gold.
This has not happened yet.

Indeed, the Court's treatment of the

rationale for upholding or denying particular religious claims for
preference or exemption has been too sporadic to confidently predict how
it might decide a variety of issues.

In recent cases on legislative

chaplains, tuition tax deductions, federal aid stipulations, and
religious displays, the Court's decisions cut across the grain of many
of its previous rulings.

It cites the separationist rhetoric of the

Everson and McCollum decisions but the reality is still a very
unpredictable, potentially entangling, accommodationism.
The problem may be even more deep seated than has yet been
suggested by constitutional scholars.

Giannella described the nature of

the relationship between church and state as it presents itself today:
In a political society characterized by significant governmental
disability and wide personal autonomy, religious interests need not
make special claims to achieve a wide zone of immunity. But in a
society where governmental regulation is pervasive and individual
freedom generally limited, religious interests must make special
claims vis-a-vis the state if they are to enjoy an equally wide
ambit of action. 5
It is difficult to argue with the last statement purely as a
practical matter.

But if religion becomes only one more special

interest to be appeased or special claim to be adjusted, what is then
left to be said about the intrinsic value of religious liberty?
conflicts between church and state occur, it may indicate that

When
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fundamental principles of justice have been violated by one or both
sides.

It is often assumed that conscientious opposition to laws on

principled grounds demands nothing more than an exemption in the absence
of a compelling state interest.

But this approach reduces the

conscientious principle to the status of a

11

personal truth 11 whose

validity may not be questioned but which is not in any way regarded as
binding society in its observance.

It begs the question whether liberty

of conscience is protected in the interest of protecting truths that
make a claim on all of society.

If the primary value of the First

Amendment is to safeguard whatever truths may be gleaned from any
vantage, then vagueness about the scope of the liberties it protects may
only compound a common political tendency to ignore critics and reduce
every argument to a matter of competing interests or points of view.

It

is worth asking, then, whether a polity founded upon certain common
religious and political principles can successfully operate apart from
its founding traditions.
Civil Rights
The Court has given a fairly broad construction to the religious
rights of prisoners under the Civil Rights Act.

In Cooper v. Pate, 378

U.S. 546 (1964), it held that a member of the Black Muslim sect may not
be denied permission to purchase religious publications.
In another case involving the rights of prisoners, Cruz v. Beta,
405 U.S. 319 (1972), the Court held that even though a special place of
worship need not be provided for every faith represented at a prison,
reasonable opportunities must be afforded all prisoners for the free
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exercise of their religion, including the holding of religious services.
But Justice Rehnquist believed that this particular case should have
been dismissed as frivolous and suggested that it may have been the
brainchild of an "unscrupulous writ-writer."

He called attention to

what the trial judge had called the "voluminous, repetitious,
duplicitous and in many instances deceitful" actions previously brought
by the prisoner.
In Trans World Airlines v. Hardison and International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), the
Court reversed a religious discrimination judgment in favor of a former
stores clerk.

The respondent, who had joined the sabbatarian Worldwide

Church of God in 1968, was originally able to avoid a scheduling
conflict by transferring to the night shift.

Later, when he transferred

to a different building, he lost his seniority and was required to
substitute for a vacationing employee on Saturday.

The union was

unwilling to violate the seniority provisions of the collective
bargaining contract in order to arrive at an accommodation and the
company fired the respondent after he refused to report for work on
Saturdays.
An appellate court ruled that the airline and labor union had
failed to comply with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, among
other things, prohibited religious discrimination in employment.

But

Justice White, writing for the Court, resorted to a balancing test and
held that the company was under no obligation to take steps inconsistent
with a valid agreement: "Collective bargaining, aimed at effecting
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workable and enforceable agreements between management and labor, lies
at the core of our national labor policy, and seniority provisions are
universally included in these contracts" (97 S.Ct. 2264, 2274).

It

maintained that if the airline had ordered a senior employee to replace
him, "it would have denied [him] his shift preference so that Hardison
could be given his" (97 S.Ct. 2264, 2275).
Justice Marshall, who was joined by Justice Brennan, was troubled
by a result that compelled "adherents of minority religions to make the
cruel choice of surrendering their religion or their job."
that the Court had ignored the clear meaning of the act.

He concluded
He suggested

that various alternatives were available to TWA to make a reasonable
accommodation.
Church Tax Exemptions
One area of considerable controversy in recent years concerns the
nature of the income and property tax exemptions enjoyed by churches.
Now that churches have been required to make social security payments
for all of their non-ministerial employees, this issue promises to
become very acute in 1984.

Different philosophies of tax exemption are

currently in wide circulation.

Some argue that they are immunities that

protect churches from political interference.

Other argue that they are

privileges that may be accorded or denied charitable organizations in
general.

Still others claim that they are subsidies that may not be

lawfully awarded to churches on establishment clause grounds.
The Court first weighed the constitutionality of church tax
exemptions in Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664
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(1970), a case in which the the New York City Tax Commission was sued
for granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for
property solely used for religious worship.

Chief Justice Burger, who

wrote for the majority, briefly touched on the establishment isue: "It
is sufficient to note that for the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of
the First Amendment the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity" (397 U.S. 664, 668).

He emphasized the

difficulties of steering a "neutral course" between the apparently
competing demands of the religion clauses and proposed a flexible
approach:
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all
that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate
either governmentally established religion or governmental
interference with religion. Short of those expressly governmental
acts, there is room for play at the joints productive of a
benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference (397 U.S. 664, 669).
But he urged that government involvement with religion is unavoidable,
adding that "the very existence of the Religion Clauses is an
involvement of sorts--one that seeks to mark boundaries to avoid
excessive entanglement" (397 U.S. 664. 670).
Upon a review of the legislative history of the New York exemption,
the Chief Justice concluded there was no evidence of an intent to
establish religion, only a desire to spare "the exercise of religion
from the burden of property taxation levied on private profit
institutions" (397 U.S. 664, 673).

He added:

We find it unnecessary to justify the tax exemption on the social
welfare services or "good works" that some churches perform for
parishioners and others--family counselling, aid to the elderly and
the infirm, and to children. Churches vary substantially in the
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scope of such services; programs expand or contract according to
resources and need. As public-sponsored programs enlarge, private
aid from the church sector may diminish. The extent of social
services may vary, depending on whether the church serves an urban
or rural, a rich or poor constituency. To give emphasis to so
variable an aspect of the work of religious bodies would introduce
an element of governmental evaluation and standards as to the worth
of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a kind of
continuing day-to-day relationship which the policy of neutrality
seeks to minimize. Hence, the use of a social welfare yardstick as
a significant element to qualify for tax exemption could
conceivably give rise to confrontations that could escalate to
constitutional dimensions (397 U.S. 664, 674).
He drew a distinction between tax exemptions and subsidies and indicated
that no transfer of funds was taking place, but also sought to balance a
number of competing factors in order to ensure that the end result of
the exemption "is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion."
The test is inescapably one of degree. Either course, taxation of
churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with
religion. The test is inescapably one of degree. Elimination of
exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by
giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that
follow in the train of those legal processes.
Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford
an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a
lesser, involvement than taxing them. In analyzing either
alternative the questions are whether the involvement is excessive,
and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and
continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of
entanglement (397 U.S. 664, 674-75).
Justice Brennan concurred for the reasons he expressed in his
Schempp opinion: " . . . the line >ve must draw between the permissible
and impermissible is one which which accords with history and faithfully
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers" (397 U.S. 664, 680).
He contended that the tax exemption of churches is clearly supported by
the historical evidence:
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The absence of concern about the exemptions could not have resulted
from any failure to foresee the possibility of their existence, for
they were widespread during colonial days. Rather, it seems clear
that the exemptions were not among the evils that the Framers and
Ratifiers of the Establishment Clause sought to avoid (397 U.S.
664' 682).
Justice Brennan maintained that such exemptions serve two secular
purposes: they bear community welfare burdens that would otherwise have
to be met by taxation or not met at all, and they "uniquely contribute
to the pluralism of American society by their religious activities."
Like the Chief Justice, he also refused to equate tax exemptions with
subsidies, reserving the latter term for instances involving "the direct
transfer of public monies."
In another concurring opinion, Justice Harlan indicated he was
concerned about "the radiations of the issues involved," especially the
potential for political divisiveness if a high degree of government
involvement is required.

6

But he concluded that churches may properly

receive an exemption in the context of a broad statute exempting a
variety of groups, "even though they do not sponsor the secular-type
activities mentioned in the statute but exist merely for the convenience
of their interested members" (397 U.S. 664, 697).

Moreover, he

suggested that states "should be freer to experiment with
involvement--on a neutral basis--than the Federal Government," including
direct aid.

But in a footnote which probably referred to Justice

Brennan's opinion, he added: "The dimension of the problem would also
require consideration of what kind of pluralistic society is compatible
with the political concepts and traditions embodied in our Constitution"
(397 U.S. 664, 699 n2) . . Wilber Katz, who was an early proponent of the
policy of neutrality, later commented:
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Turning the question around, what kinds of pluralistic societies
may be incompatible with our traditions? This would presumably be
true of a pluralism in which equal benefits would be given to
groups from which persons are excluded on grounds of race. Might
it conceivably be true of a pluralism in which equal favor would be
shown to groups which reject the principle of religious liberty? 7
For that matter, might it even be true of a pluralism in which equal
favor would be be shown to groups from which persons are excluded on
grounds of religion or some other distinctive?
Justice Douglas, the only dissenter, insisted that a tax exemption
is a subsidy and remarked that the tax exemption of churches is "highly
suspect, as it arose in the early days when the church was an agency of
the state."

He contended that the church as a church or as a welfare

agency must be treated differently than other organizations, "lest we in
time allow the church qua church to be on the public payroll, which, I
fear, is imminent."

He reiterated a comment by Justice Brennan in the

Schempp case: "'It is not only the nonbeliever who fears the injection
of sectarian doctrines and controversies into the civil policy, but in
as high degree it is the devout believer who fears the secularization of
a creed which becomes too deeply involved with and dependent upon the
government'" (374 U.S. 203, 259; 397 U.S. 664, 711).

He concluded with

a discussion of this "old, old problem" of government aid, which he
illustrated by citing various objections that had been raised by
Presidents Madison and Grant, then reviewing a study of real estate
holdings by churches and statistics on federal grants to private
religious schools.
It is difficult to assess whether the Walz ruling, despite its
support by eight justices, lends much support to an argument for tax
immunity or mandatory tax exemption.

This implication may be drawn from
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the Chief Justice's remarks on excessive entanglement.

But a clear

statement like the Court's earlier refusal to accept the licensing and
taxing of colporteurs is missing here.

Indeed, Justice Douglas had

earlier indicated in his Murdock opinion that "a tax on the income of
one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or
employed in connection with those activities" is permissible, although
this does not appear to square with the implications of the Follett
ruling.

In Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972),

the Court vacated a lower court decision upholding the validity of a
recently repealed Florida statute that exempted church property used as
a commercial parking lot.

Justice Douglas dissented.

By then, the divisions had sharpened in a pair of school aid cases
that signaled the doctrinal fluctuations that have characterized the
Burger Court.

By the end of the decade, the Court handed down more than

a dozen separate decisions on this subject.

Arguments over fairness,

neutrality, entanglement, political divisiveness, and secularization all
came into play.

The entire controversy became highly abstruse and

involuted, much like the pornography and subversive activities cases.
The debate is likely to continue in this vein until the Court breaks out
of this self-imposed dilemma and begins grappling with an even more
basic issues, such as finding solutions that neither burden nor
subsidize religious schools and their patrons.
Private School Aid
The Court's consideration of aid to private schools began in
earnest with two decisions in 1968.

In Flast v. Cohen, 302 U.S. 83
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(1968), it set the stage by holding that federal taxpayers have standing
to sue to prevent federal expenditures for the purchase of textbooks and
other instructional materials.

Five separate opinions, including one

dissent, were written, foreshadowing the fragmentation of the Court on
this entire issue of school aid.

In fact, three justices dissented in

the first of this series, Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968), which was decided the same day.

The Court upheld a New York

statute requiring school districts to purchase and loan textbooks to
students enrolled in public and parochial schools.

Justice White, who

wrote for the majority, based his opinion on the child benefit concept
of the Everson case.

He cited the Pierce decision in support of his

view that "religious schools pursue two goals, religious instruction and
secular education:"
A premise of this holding was the view that the State's interest in
education would be served sufficiently by reliance on the secular
teaching that accompanied religious training in the schools
maintained by the Society of Sisters. Since Pierce, a substantial
body of case law has confirmed the pm..rer of the States to insist
that attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state
compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide
minimum hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified
training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction. Indeed,
the State's interest in asuring that these standards are being met
has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept
instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education
statutes" (392 U.S. 236, 246-47).
Justices Black, Douglas, and Fortas dissented separately.

Justice

Douglas concentrated his attack on the ideological nature of textbooks
by cannily pulling passages from various science and history textbooks
that supported various religious viewpoints and then asking whether
these books would be eligible for the program.

He believed this

practice presaged a politicization of the textbook selection process:
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It will be difficult, as Mr. Justice Jackson said, to say "where
the secular ends and the sectarian begins in education." People of
State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S.,
at 237-238, 68 S.Ct., at 478. But certain it is that once the
so-called "secular" textbook is the prize to be won by that
religious faith which selects the book, the battle will be on for
those positions of control. Judge Van Voorhis expressed the fear
that in the end the state might dominate the church. Others fear
that one sectarian group, gaining control the state agencies which
approve the "secular" textbooks, will use their control to
disseminate ideas most congenial to their faith (392 U.S. 236,
262).
What Justice Douglas foresaw regarding the textbook selection
process has, indeed, come to pass.

The reasons for this, however, are

not exclusively connected with the loans of textbooks.

Indeed, the

problem is inherent in the process due to the ideological nature of
textbooks, the competing interests that have a stake in their selection,
and the difficulty of knowing where the sectarian ends and the secular
begins in education.

Recent efforts by state education departments to

pools their collective purchasing power in order to demand improvements
have accompanied publicity over the poor intellectual quality of many
textbooks.

8

Part of the difficulty comes from having to please too many

interests and satisfying none in the process.
But Justice Douglas's point is well taken.

The tender of federal

or state aid may be characterized as an attractive nuisance.
Financially pressed colleges and grade schools are often all too willing
to accept the strings attached to government money.

But while it is

true that many schools erect a secular facade in order to obtain a
financial edge, the other side of the coin is that over a period of time
these church-affiliated schools that receive grant money tend to lose
their identity and their original mission.
ways.

It is an edge that cuts both

In France, the price of aid to parochial schools may be ultimate
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absorption into the public school system. 9
Three years later, the Court ruled in Tilton v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 672 (1971 ), that federal grant money may be used by church-related
colleges and universities for the construction of academic facilities
under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, but overturned a
twenty year limitation on a provision that the facilities must be used
for secular educational purposes.

Chief Justice Burger claimed that the

entanglement problems were minimized because "college students are less
impressionable and less susceptible to religious indoctrination" (403
U.S. 672, 686).

He also believed that surveillance problems were

reduced because the "the Government aid here is a one-time,
single-purpose construction grant" (403 U.S. 672, 688).

Three justices

dissented.
Lemon v. Kurtzman and its companion cases, Earley v. DiCenso and
Robinson v. DiCenso, 403 U.S. 602 (1971 ), were decided on the same day
as the Tilton case.

These cases involved a Pennsylvania statute

authorizing salary supplements for teachers of secular subjects in
religious schools and a Rhode Island statute that provided a similar
"purchase of services" from nonpublic schools whereby the state
reimbursed the schools for teachers' salaries, textbooks, and
instructional materials.

The Court ruled both statutes unconstitutional

but split on doctrinal issues.

The Chief Justice wrote the Court's

opinion but was joined by only three other justices.
dissented in one of the two cases.

Justice White

Justice Brennan concurred but sought

a stronger rejection of school aid by the Court.

Justices Black and

Marshall joined a separate concurring opinion by Justice Douglas.
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The Chief Justice injected the Court's opinion with an
accommodationist coloring when he cited the Everson case and remarked
that the line between permissible and impermissible aid is difficult to
perceive.

He set forth the famous three-part test used--with the

notable exception of Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3330 (1983)--in
subsequent establishment cases: "First, the statute must have a secular
legislative purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion . . . ; finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion'"
(403 U.S. 602, 612-613).

But he emphasized that a total separation

between church and state is impossible:
Fire inspections, building and zoning regulations, and state
requirements under compulsory school-attendance laws are examples
of necessary and permissible contacts. Indeed, under the statutory
exemption before us in Walz, the State had a continuing burden to
ascertain that the exempt property was in fact being used for
religious worship. Judicial caveats against entanglement must
recognize that the line of separation, far from being a "wall," is
a blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the
circumstances of a particular relationship (403 U.S. 602, 614).
The most revealing part of this opinion, however, was the Chief
Justice's application of the concept of "divisive political potential,"
which he considered a variety of entanglement:
Ordinarily political debate and division, however vigorous or even
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic
system of government, but political division along religious lines
was one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment
was intended to protect • . . . To have States or communities divide
on the issues presented by state aid to parochial schools would
tend to confuse and obscure other issues of great urgency. We have
an expanding array of vexing issues, local and national, domestic
and international, to debate and divide on. It conflicts with our
whole history and tradition to permit questions of the Religion
Clauses to assume such importance in our legislatures and in our
elections that they could divert attention from the myriad issues
and problems that confront every level of government (403 U.S. 602,
622-23).
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This last statement was astonishing in the sweep of its implications and
the use of political divisiveness as a test has found considerable
disfavor.

But there is evidence that the Court has qualified its

construction of it.

Justices Brennan and Sandra Day O'Connor both

indicated in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1367, 1375 n9 (1984),
that the focus of any inquiry into political divisiveness must be "on
the character of the government activity that might cause such
divisiveness."
The Lemon case represented the first time the Court itself had
struck a law permitting aid to private religious schools.

It then

remanded the case to a trial court for an appropriate decree.

But the

trial court did not prohibit payment for services provided before that
date.

Subsequently, in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973), known as

Lemon II, the Court enjoined further payments under an elaborate
procedure set by Pennsylvania to insure that state payments only went
for services to services kept free of religious influences, but it did
not deal with the reimbursement issue.

Later, it held in New York v.

Cathedral School, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), that the schools affected by its
earlier decisions could not be reimbursed for services they had already
performed.
The Lemon ruling inaugurated a series of separationist decisions,
but the Court's record after 1975 became increasingly uneven.

In

Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), the Court held that a
Mississippi textbook program crossed the line of permissibility because
it aided private schools that might practice racial discrimination.

In

Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S.
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472 (1973), ruled as impermissible the reimbursement of private schools
for expenses incurred in the administration and grading of examinations,
including traditional teacher-prepared tests.

But the Court was more

clearly divided in Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973), when it rejected maintenance and repair
grants, along with tuition reimbursement grants in this case and in
Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).

Justice Powell wrote for the

majority in the Nyquist case that "not every law that confers an
'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious
institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid" (413
U.S. 756, 771 ).

In Grit v. Wolman, 413 U.S. 901 (1973), and Byrne v.

Public Funds for Public Schools, 442 U.S. 907 (1979), the Court
summarily affirmed decisions rejecting tuition relief schemes.

But in

Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 724 (1973), the Court upheld state bond issues
for the construction of facilities to be leased back to colleges for
exclusively secular uses.
The following year, the Court sidestepped a question in Wheeler v.
Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), whether federal funds could be used in
teaching educationally deprived children on the premises of private
religious schools, which was adopted as a means of administering Title I
of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.

Title I had been

amended to provide federal funding for special programs for
educationally deprived children in both public and private schools.
Justice Douglas, who was again the lone dissenter, chided his brethren:
The plain truth is that under the First Amendment, as construed to
this day, the Act is unconstitutional to the extent it supports
sectarian schools, whether directly or through its students.
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We should say so now, and save endless hours and efforts which
hopeful people will expend in an effort to constitutionalize what
is impossible without a constitutional amendment (417 U.S. 402,
432).
But hope springs eternal in the human breast.

In Meek v.

Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), the Court split over the specific forms
of permissible aid when it ruled invalid the provision of auxiliary
service programs and the direct loan of instructional materials and
equipment, but upheld textbook loans.

A year later the still divided

Court upheld noncategorical grants to public and private colleges in
Roemer v. Board of Public Works of Maryland, 426 U.S. 736 (1976).

The

divisions finally reached a climax in Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977), when the Court upheld state expenditures for textbook loans,
standardized test and scoring services, and diagnostic and therapeutic
services for private school students, but rejected expenditures for
transportation on field trips and for instructional materials or
equipment.

Six separate opinions--concurring in part and dissenting in

part--were written.

Justice Harry Blackmun, who wrote the first part of

the Court's opinion, attributed a definite secular purpose to these
practices: "The State may require that schools that are utilized to
fulfill the State's compulsory-education requirement meet certain
standards of instruction, . . . and may examine both teachers and pupils
to ensure that the State's legitimate interest is being fulfilled" (43

u.s.

229, 240).
But three years later Justice Blackmun was among the dissenters in

Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646 (1980), when the Court held that the Wolman case was controlling and
upheld direct cash reimbursements to schools that administered
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state-prescribed examinations and graded them.

Justice Blackmun

underscored the perplexities by citing defections among the judges from
one side to the other in the course of the decade since the first Lemon
case.

Justice Stevens, who also dissented in this case, aptly

summarized the entire series of school aid rulings as follows:
The Court's approval of a direct subsidy to sectarian schools to
reimburse them for staff time spent in taking attendance and
grading standardized tests is but another in a long line of cases
making largely ad hoc decisions about what payments may or may not
be constitutionally made to nonpublic schools. In groping for a
rationale to support today's decision, the Court has taken a
position that could equally be used to support a subsidy to pay for
staff time attributable to conducting fire drills or even for
constructing and maintaining fireproof premises in which to conduct
classes. Though such subsidies might represent expedient fiscal
policy, I firmly believe they would violate the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment (444 U.S. 646, 671 ).
Thus disagreements over the application of the establishment clause
in schol aid cases had brought the Court to a stalemate by 1980.

Ever

since they were devised, the secular purpose and neutral primary effect
tests have been used to justify policies as variable as the enforcement
of Sunday closing laws against Orthodox Jews, aid to religious schools
because they are agents of the state, and the withholding of such aid to
religious schools because they are not completely secular. shifts among
the justices and the ad hoc nature of the Court's rulings should not be
too surprising considering the depth of the underlying problem.

A total

prohibition of school aid, like a denial of religion-based exemptions,
might then compel the court to examine the establishment implications of
basic public policies, whether they are the utilization of religious
schools to carry out secular state purposes or the use of religious
symbols or values to bolster a sense of community spirit or national and
local allegiance.

The fact that religious schools--and even

417
churches--are incorporated by the state suggests that they may be
treated as agents of the state.

If the Court were ever to adopt this

view, its implications from a separationist standpoint can only be
imagined.
Perhaps the issue is whether a true disestablishment of religion is
even possible and what a policy of strict separation might therefore
entail if it were ever practically implemented.

The accommodationists

have persisted in minimizing or ignoring the entanglements involved in
direct and even indirect aid.

The separationists have similarly

overlooked the already considerable burden the state places on religious
organizations by setting various requirements and then subsidizing their
expenses for all schools but sectarian schools.

Neither side has been

able to find a satisfactory common ground and may never do so as long as
they seek their equally unreachable goals of religious neutrality and
secular homogeneity.
Compulsory School Attendance
By 1972, the Court had already ruled in several cases that clearly
involved compulsion of religious belief or practice.

It had struck down

various laws and regulations in the Pierce, Barnette, Torcaso, and
Sherbert cases.

On the establishment side of the ledger, the Engels and

Schempp cases are particularly illustrative.
After the Sherbert case, the Court handed down another
groundbreaking ruling in this regard when it restricted the parens
patriae power of the state in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972),
and permitted Amish children to withdraw from school after completing
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the eighth grade.

Chief Justice Burger reviewed at length the Amish way

of life and their educational views, noting that "they view secondary
school as an impermissible exposure of their children to a 'worldly'
influence in conflict with their beliefs" (406 U.S. 205, 211 ), and that
they usually establish their own elementary schools.

Expert witnesses

testified that high school age children were taught to be productive
citizens through a system of learning by doing and contended that high
school attendance would result in great psychological harm for the Amish
children and in the destruction of the Old Order Amish community.
The Chief Justice drew on the Pierce and Sherbert rulings in
writing his opinion:
There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high
responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable
regulations for the control and duration of basic education. . . .
Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of
a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce,
made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent
education in a privately operated system. . . . As that case
suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious
upbringing and education of their children in their early and
formative years have a high place in our society . . . . Thus, a
State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it,
is not totally free from the balancing process when it impinges on
fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and
the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious
upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of
Pierce, "prepare [them] for additional obligations" (406 U.S. 205,
213-14).
Drawing on the Sherbert test, he declared: "A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional
requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion" (406 U.S. 205, 220).
The Chief Justice also reviewed the origins of compulsory school
attendance laws, associating them with the movement to prohibit child
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labor, and rejected "a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing
scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable
application as that urged by the State" (406 U.S. 205, 234).

11

But the

decision was a narrow one that not greatly influenced subsequent state
actions.

Justices Stewart and Brennan concurred with the observation

that Wisconsin had sought to brand the parents as criminals for
following their religious beliefs.

Justice White placed a narrow

construction on the Court's decision and commented that the
administration of an exemption for Old Order Amish "will inevitably
involve the kind of close and perhaps repeated scrutiny of religious
practices
(406

u.s.

. • which the Court has heretofore been anxious to avoid"
205, 240).

Justice Douglas, however, dissented on the grounds that the
children had not been examined by the Court to determine their own
wishes in the matter.

He also did not believe that the "law and order"

record of the Amish was relevant and remarked that a religion is a
religion regardless of the criminal records of its members.

But he

conceded that "if a group or society was organized to perpetuate crime
and that is its motive, we would have rather startling problems akin to
those that were raised when some years back a particular sect was
challenged here as operating on a fraudulent basis'' (406 U.S. 205, 246).
Referring to the polygamy decisions, he predicted:
Action, which the Court deemed to be antisocial, could be punished
even though it was grounded on deeply held and sincere religious
convictions. What we do today, at least in this respect, opens the
way to give organized religion a broader base than it has ever
enjoyed; and it even promises that in time Reynolds will be
overruled (406 U.S. 205, 247).
Richard E. Morgan has represented the ruling as a major doctrinal
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innovation:
. . . Yoder . . . suggests that Burger may be in the process of
persuading himself that "no-entanglement" is an altogether
independent value; that there is no establishment clause violation
absent of entanglement. Government may create favored
classifications for the religious so long as it does not
administratively intermeddle . . . . The free-exercise clause has
now grown far beyond the confines of Reynolds, and it is
problematical whether the Burger Court, even if a majority wisf.Zd
to, could reduce free-exercise to its pre-Sherbert dimensions.
But in fact the Yoder case was narrowly decided and, to date,
remains a singular exception.

Those who expected a higher profile for

the free exercise clause have had a long wait.
to drop.

The other shoe has yet

As in the Sherbert case, the Court simply balanced the free

exercise and establishment considerations, tipping them in favor of the
free exercise values.

But there is no indication that the Court is

willing to extend such exceptions.

Years earlier it had let stand

without comment a lower court ruling in Donner v. New York, 342 U.S. 884
(1951 ), that upheld compulsory attendance at state-approved elementary
schools despite its effect of inhibiting religious liberty.
In the absence of a clear standard of religious practice, the Court
has had to continually wrestle with the problem of where and how to draw
the line between free exercise rights and the interest of society in
being "left free to reach actions which [are] in violation of social
duties or subversive of good order" (98 U.S. 145, 167).

Given the

breadth of the social behavior compassed by the word religion, the
difficulties raised by Justice Douglas are not to be lightly dismissed.
The ingenuity of state legislatures and local officials in discovering
new ways of either favoring or restricting religious behavior should not
be discounted.

Very often the prevailing attitude is that where there
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is a will there is a way.

These ways are many and varied.

not suffice, there are many others to call upon.

If one does

Thus in legal battles

over government subsidies or regulations, the final outcome is most
likely to be determined by the larger purse.
Synthesis
Several recurring motifs knit the Supreme Court's pronouncements on
religious issues throughout its history.

The later free exercise and

establishment clause tests draw upon political and religious
perspectives that span several centuries.
The major theme is a variation of the state religion motif.

This

is the idea that the state, as the sovereign, is the parens patriae over
the people of the land, including the church.
claimed to be the vicar of Christ.

The Holy Roman Emperor

The later French and English

monarchs were awarded such titles as Most Christian King and Defender of
the Faith and the church was one of the great estates of the realm.
first Oueen Elizabeth became Head of the Church of England.

The

Political

power was always expected to be vested with spiritual authority.
Napoleon's act of crowning himself thus had great significance, as did
his dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire.

Together they symbolized the

end of the idea of a united Christian Europe.
The institutions of the state, some of which predate ancient Rome,
are religious in origin.

Their current identification with secular

regimes does not in the least detract from their religious significance
but it has nevertheless changed the character of the relationship
between church and state.

From the viewpoint of the church, the state
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is still obliged to be "a minister for good."

E. R. Norman maintains

that a total separation of religious belief and public life was never
contemplated by the religious dissenters who sought to disestablish and
remove "the privileged and exclusive state churches" and insists that
"an overwhelming majority of men still believed in the confessional
office of the state."

13

conscience of the state.

But the church of today no longer serves as the
This role is claimed by academia, the press,

presidential advisers, the courts, and congressional committees.

Of

course, the question of who will guard the guardians remains the
perennial problem under any regime.
The nature of the current disestablishment of religion is such that
the political participation of the church must be fairly circumspect.
The spiritual authority of the church still receives considerable
deference.

But as an organization that holds property and makes

pronouncements on politically sensitive issues, the church is generally
treated as one among many competing interest groups.

Many of the

accoutrements of state religion have survived their original functions,
but they are not placed in the service of avowedly secular purposes with
the stipulation that they use the least restrictive means consistent
with state interests and be religiously neutral in effect.
The minor theme of the Court's rulings on religion is the perennial
quest to maintain a constitutional balance between compelling state
interests and religious liberties.

Assuming that the state is not

simply a neutral arbiter of competing interests with none of its own, it
will tend to favor some religions over others despite all intentions to
the contrary.

Whatever may be said about the justice of the rulings
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themselves, the admitted religious bias of the Reynolds and Davis
rulings was a more predictable and more realistic judicial standard than
the professed religious neutrality of the Everson and Lemon cases.

If

religion can include practically any idea or activity, then the
constitutional importance of religion is likely to suffer in the
interests of maintaining order.
By disestablishing religion, the judiciary has not thereby avoided
the pitfalls of state religion.
the conflict.

It has simply disguised the nature of

Religious activities that do not show their colors enjoy

an advantage over those that do.

It is difficult to imagine that a

teacher might be prevented from teaching classical, Marxist, or
Keynesian economics on the grounds that this would be an establishment
of religion.

But Justice Black articulated a fundamental problem in his

Epperson dissent when he suggested that the evolutionary theory has a
religious bias.

Evangelical Christians, for example, will be found on

almost all sides of any of these issues.

But the significant fact here

is that the issues themselves are politically and religiously divisive
because they raise basic questions of a religious nature.

While

interpretations and applications of biblical teachings respecting
creation, tithing, just weights and measures, employment practices, and
property may differ, the issues are no less religious in the context of
a political discussion than in a church setting.

The secularization of

the Sunday closing laws does not make them any less of a religious
establishment than the secularization of the Christmas holiday in the
recent Lynch case.

To maintain otherwise, as Justice Brennan suggested

in the latter case, is to trivialize the institution.

424
The free exercise tests used in the Reynolds and Davis cases appear
to have begun losing ground with the Murdoch, Ballard, or Torcaso
decisions.

The Seeger and Welsh cases took the redefinition of religion

to such an extreme that its usefulness as a definition of conduct--as
opposed to mere belief--has been terminated.

It was with the Sherbert

ruling, however, that the free exercise clause acquired for the first
time an independent status from other First Amendment considerations.
Along with the Yoder decision, it represents a unique attempt to ensure
free exercise values and, as such, may remain highly exceptional.

Not

only a clear and present danger but a compelling state interest may be
generally cited as restrictions upon free exercise values.

But it

appears that the Reynolds and Davis tests, which defined religion more
narrowly, might not have necessitated the kind of balancing between
religious and state interests that has resulted.

Had these rulings

served more completely as a model for later doctrinal refinements the
Court might have avoided creating a tension between the free exercise
and establishment clauses by taking a narrower view of each.

Perhaps

this would have vindicated Justice Harlan's assertion in the Sberbert
case that the "situations in which the constitution may require special
treatment on account of religion . . . are few and far between" (374

u.s.

398, 423).
Assuming that the modern state is less guided by its religious

traditions than ever, the conflicts between state interest and religious
conscience may be expected to increase.

ln this context, it is not

special treatment for dissenters but a careful review of priorities that
is required.

Different perceptions of power, mcrality, and the common
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good are often at work whenever fundamental religious values--including
those of the state--come into conflict.

The issues themselves are often

short-lived and are rarely brought to general public attention, but they
are dominated by recurring themes that may be indicative of more general
problems of public policy.

As a record of the shifting battle lines,

the agenda at the Conference on Government Intervention in Religious
Affairs, which was held in the Spring of 1982 in Washington, D.C., is
especially illuminating:
1 . Efforts by state and local governments to regulate fund-raising
by religious bodies
2. Efforts to require religious bodies to register with and report
to government officials if they engage in efforts to influence
legislation (so-called "lobbying disclosure" laws)
3. Efforts by the National Labor Relations Board to supervise
elections for labor representation by lay teachers in Roman
Catholic parochial schools (which have been halted by the U. S.
Supreme Court)
4. In te.rnal Revenue Service's definition of "integrated
auxiliaries" of churches that tends to separate church-related
colleges and hospitals from the churches that sponsor them and
to link them instead to their "secular counterparts"
5. Attempts by state departments of education to regulate the
curriculum content and teachers' qualifications in Christian
schools (which have been halted by state courts in Ohio,
Vermont, and Kentucky, but upheld in Nebraska, Wisconsin, and
Maine)
6. Attempts by federal and state departments of labor to collect
unemployment compensation taxes from church-related agencies
that hitherto were exempt, as churches are
7. Imposing by the (then) Department of Health, Education and
Welfare of requirements of coeducational sports, hygiene
instruction, dormitory and off-campus residence policies on
church-related college (such as Brigham Young University) which
have religious objections to mingling of the sexes in such ways
8. Efforts by several federal agencies (Civil Rights Commission,
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, Department of Health
and Human Services, Department of Education) to require
church-related agencies and institutions, including theological
seminaries, to report their employment and admissions
statistics by race, sex, and religion, even though they receive
no government funds, with threats to cut off grants or loans to
students unless they hire faculty, for instance, from other
religious adherences
9. Sampling surveys by the Bureau of the Census of churches and
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10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.

17.

church agencies, requiring them to submit voluminous reports
under penalty of law, even though the Bureau admitted to a
church attorney that it had no authority to do so, but refused
to advise churches that they were not required to comply
Grand jury interrogation of church workers about internal
affairs of churches
Use by intelligence agencies of clergy and missionaries as
informants
Subpoenas of ecclesiastical records by plaintiffs and
defendants in civil and criminal suits
Placing a church in receivership because of allegations of
mismanagement of church funds made by dissident members
Granting by courts conservatorship orders allowing parents to
obtain physical custody of (adult) offspring out of unpopular
religious movements for purposes of forcing them to abandon
their adherence thereto
Withdrawal by IRS of tax exemption from various religious
groups for failure to comply with "public policy"
Determination by IRS of what is "religious ministry" by clergy
to qualify for exclusion of cash housing allowance from
taxable income (often in contradiction to the religious body's
own definition of "ministry")
Redefinition by the civil courts of ecclesiastical polity, so
that hierarchical bodies are often in effect rendered
congregational with respect to their ability to control local
church property, and dispersed "connectional" bodies are
deemed to be hierarchical with respect to their ostensible
liability for torts committed by local ertities, contrary to
their own self-definition in both cases 14

So far, the Supreme Court has directly addressed only the third,
fifteenth, and seventeenth of these items.

The lower courts have ruled

on several others, many of which are treated in the remaining chapters.
But this listing and the examples that follow only scratch the surface
of a problem whose depths have yet to be fully explored.

They are

simply the tangible expressions of a basic dilemma: how to protect
religious liberty when the political and legal institutions themselves
are fundamentally religious in their origins and effects.
The potential points of conflict are practically limitless, but for
the remainder of this dissertation the issues are divided into three
categories: fiscal, educational, and social regulation.

Each category
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raises different but related questions.

For example, where is the line

to be drawn regarding fees, taxes, and subsidies, such as educational
vouchers and tuition tax credits?

The Supreme Court has recently

decided unfavorably in regard to the religious tax exemptions claimed in
United States v. Lee, 102 S.Ct. 1051 (1982), and Bob Jones University v.
United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017 (1983).

In the area of education, does

the free exercise clause have any bearing on mandatory curriculum
standards and teacher certification requirements?

And in regard to

social regulation, should churches and church schools have a free hand
in helping to shape the face of their communities?

In Larkin v.

Grendel's Den, 103 S.Ct. 505 (1982), the Court held that churches may
not be empowered to effectively veto the location of a liquor store in
their immediate neighborhood.
Changing practical circumstances have considerably altered the
character of the basic separationist and accommodationist positions.
Neither position is necessarily hostile to religious liberty, but either
one may be used to suppress religious liberty.

Judicial doctrine has

reached such an impasse that it may be time to change the terms of
debate.

It is hoped that the discussion which follows will provide some

assistance toward restructuring the political alternatives and
reconstituting the conscience of the state.
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